It is quite possible that a person in a not-quite-healthy is capable of decisions in _general_ but the decision to end one's life will have an abnormally large appeal and thus provide warped incentives compared to an able-to-think-clearly person. Just like gamblers are capable of decisions in _general_ but have to restrict themselves from casinos because they know they won't make the right decisions there.
Decision-making capacity is on a spectrum, so having it for one type of decision doesn't mean one has it for others. MAID assessors know this when they assess capacity.
It is quite possible that a person in a not-quite-healthy is capable of decisions in _general_ but the decision to end one's life will have an abnormally large appeal and thus provide warped incentives compared to an able-to-think-clearly person. Just like gamblers are capable of decisions in _general_ but have to restrict themselves from casinos because they know they won't make the right decisions there.
Decision-making capacity is on a spectrum, so having it for one type of decision doesn't mean one has it for others. MAID assessors know this when they assess capacity.
But you do understand the… unseemly incentives here, right? Especially given we can't exactly conduct a satisfaction survey of those who used MAiD.
I just wrote about Smith's claims: https://valuejudgments.substack.com/p/does-maid-create-perverse-incentives